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The Courts in Broadcast Regulatory
Policy-Making
By LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY*
ERWIN G. KRASNOW**
HERBERT A. TERRY***
In the early decades of broadcast regulation, the regulatory
process was dominated by, and largely restricted to, three ma-
jor participants-Congress, the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC), and the industry itself.1 They were the three
focal points of a closely knit triangle of pressure, cooperation,
and shifting alliances. The lines of influence and power were
clear, and each participant knew how to work for what it
wanted. This balance of forces which prevailed for so long,
however, has now been altered by the increased involvement
of three new participants in broadcast regulatory policy mak-
ing: the public, in the form of citizen groups; the White House,
by means of special advisory bodies, appointment powers,
budgetary control, and active communication-orientated divi-
sions of Cabinet level agencies; and the courts, in the form of
judicial opinions prescribing and precluding FCC policy initia-
tives. 2 Together, these three new activist participants in broad-
cast regulation have modified the FCC's role from one of
making peace with Congress and a dominant broadcast indus-
* Associate Professor of Government, Lawrence University, Appleton,
Wisconsin.
*, Senior Vice President and General Counsel National Association of Broad-
casters, Washington, D.C.
*** Assistant Professor of Telecommunications, Indiana University, Bloomington,
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1. For a discussion of the roles of these three participants (Congress, FCC, and
the broadcast industry) in broadcast regulation, see E. KRAsNow, L. LONGLEY & H.
TERRY, THE POLrTICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 33-86, 87-112 (3d ed.) [hereinafter
cited as KRASNOW, LONGLEY & TERRY].
2. Each of these three new activist participants in the making of broadcast regu-
latory policy are analyzed in detail in KRASNow, LONGLEY & TERRY, supra at 33-86, from
which some of the material contained in this article is adapted. See also Longley,
Krasnow & Terry, The Presidency in Broadcast Regulatory Policy-Making, 12 PRESI-
DENTLAL STUD. Q. (1982), and L LoNGLEY, H. TERRY & E. KRASNOW, Citizen Groups in
Broadcast Regulatory Policy-Making, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION, M. DuBNcK & A.
GrrELSON, eds., forthcoming, 1983).
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try to one of placating several often antagonistic interests. 3
Central to many of these changes has been the growing role of
the courts in broadcast regulatory policy-making.
Courts have been passive because the Anglo-American judi-
cial system limits judicial review to cases and controversies in-
volving actual legal disputes brought by proper parties. 4
Judges may not reach out to embrace problems of interest to
them but must wait until the problems are brought to them. 5
However, issues are now being raised before the courts which
previously went unnoticed by the FCC and other parties. No
one, for example, filed a Fairness Doctrine complaint against a
nationally broadcast speech by President Eisenhower, but
Fairness Doctrine complaints were repeatedly ified with the
FCC and the courts when President Nixon delivered major
broadcast speeches.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
played a major role in the growth of judicial influence in shap-
ing broadcast regulatory policy since the late 1960's. Eleven
judges plus eight senior circuit judges, appointed for life by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate comprise
the Court of Appeals.' With few exceptions, the decisions of
the Court of Appeals are made by panels of three judges.8 The
3. The analytical characteristics of the changed politics of broadcast regulation
are analyzed in KRASNOW, LONGLEY & TERRY, supra note 1, at 133-142, 271-285.
4. W. MURPHY & C. PRrrCHETr, COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLaTIcs: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 216-225 (3d ed. 1979), 216-225, and L BAUm, THE SUPREME
COURT 92-93 (1981).
5. By means of their rulings and opinions, which may contain (or be viewed as
containing) clues or hints as to judicial receptivity to various future arguments, judges
may profoundly influence what cases and appeals are brought to them. See, for exam-
ple, the long-term influence of the WLBT case [Office of Communications of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966)] in encouraging citizen group
activists. In this case, then Circuit Court Judge Warren Burger ruled that granting
legal standing to those with such an obvious and acute concern with licensing proceed-
ings as the listening audience is essential in order "that the holders of broadcasting
licenses be responsive to the needs of the audience without which the broadcaster
could not exist." Id. at 1002.
6. In part, this may have been due to the wide attention paid to the Fairness Doe.-
trine due to the landmark Red Lion case, handed down in 1969, in which the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the Fairness Doctrine, stating, "It is the right of the viewers
and listeners, not the right of broadcasters, which is paramount." Red Lion Broadcast.
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
7. The size of the circuit court varies, of course, by congressional action. In the
mid-1970s, for example, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia consisted of nine
judges. E. KRASNOW & L LONGLEY, THE PoLIIcs Op BROADCAST REGULATION 55 (2nd
ed. 1978).
8. A noteworthy exception to this general rule of three-judge panels occurred
BROADCAST POLICY-MAKING
Court of Appeals has decided a large number of cases brought
by citizen groups involving broadcast regulatory issues that
had never been subjected to the crucible of judicial review.
Only a very small proportion of the FCC's actions are re-
viewed by the courts,9 but the significance of judicial review in
the Commission's policy-making and adjudicatory processes
cannot be measured by statistical analysis alone. Judicial re-
view, no matter how seldom invoked, threatens each adminis-
trative or legislative decision. Although the courts ordinarily
allow other arms of government (such as the FCC and Con-
gress) to make policy, they possess a crucial veto power. Con-
sequently, the FCC must always consider the courts' reaction
to make sure that the policies it adopts can successfully run
the judicial gauntlet. The continual possibility of judicial re-
view thus tends to affect FCC policies even when these policies
are not formally adjudicated. As former FCC Chairman Rich-
ard Wiley once noted:
The almost iron-clad gaurantee that every major or controver-
sial FCC action will have to pass judicial muster has resulted
... in more careful and thorough Commission consideration of
proposed decisions .... [O]ur track record . . . reflects our
determination to engage in better legal analysis, increased sen-
sitivity to procedural rights of parties and, finally, greater pub-
lic interest.' 0
during litigation concerning a proposed format change for classical music station
WEFM(FM), Chicago. After an adverse ruling from a three-judge circuit court panel,
the Citizens Committee to Save WEFM successfully sought a rehearing of the case by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia en bane. This was granted and a
decision favorable to the Citizens Committee resulted. Citizens Committee to Save
WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Similarly, when the circuit court found
itself in 1979 again rebuking the FCC concerning its format change policies, it again
acted by means of the full court. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
9. Of the thousands of different FCC actions in fiscal 1980, 236 were subject to
litigation in the federal appeals courts or in the United States Supreme Court. Of
these, the Commission action was affirmed in 25 and reversed or remanded in 9.
Ninety-four of these cases were dismissed or consolidated; certiorari was denied in
three and granted in seven. At the end of fiscal year 1980, 98 cases were still pending.
Besides these 236 actions, the FCC was a party to 93 additional cases filed in Federal
District Courts. FCC ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL 1980 12 (Washington, G.P.O. 1982).
The filing of litigation against the Commission is highly irregular; at times months may
go by with only a few cases arising, then there may be a flood of cases. In the first week
of July 1982 alone, some 20 suits were initiated. Interview with General Counsel's Of-
fice, Federal Communications Commission (July 8, 1982).
10. Address by Richard E. Wiley, Chairman, FCC, to the American Bar Associa-
tion Bicentennial Institute on Oversight and Review of Agency Decision-Making,
Washington, D.C., 11 (March 18, 1976) (mimeo).
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Courts evaluate FCC decisions in two ways: Constitutional
review" and statutory review.12 Most often, a Constitutional
challenge to an FCC decision is based on the argument that the
FCC has somehow violated the First Amendment's prohibition
of abridgement of freedom of speech or press.13 Such First
Amendment arguments have been remarkably unsuccessful
with the Supreme Court, partly because of the policy of the
Court to avoid Constitutional questions if a decision can be
reached on other grounds. 4 When the Court has addressed
Constitutional questions, it has never ruled directly that the
FCC has violated the First Amendment. A good example of the
interrelationship of broadcast policy and Constitutional ques..
tions involves the FCC's efforts to "channel" risqu6 broadcasts
to times of the day when children are less likely to be in the
audience. 5 The FCC's efforts to channel such broadcasts be-
gan with a 1975 order from the FCC to Pacifica Foundation's
WBAI in New York.'6 A three-judge panel of the Court of Ap-
11. A recurring area of Constitutional review concerns the right of broadcasters,
like other media owners and operators, to be free of governmental control over the
content of programming. First Amendment theories that have been developed exclu-
sively for broadcasting hold the rights of listeners and viewers to receive information
to be paramount over the rights of broadcasters. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, (1969). See also CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981).
12. For example, in September 1980, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
had to rule on whether the 1962 All-Channel Receiver Act which authorized the FCC to
require all television sets to be "capable of adequately receiving all frequencies" allo-
cated to television broadcasting, gave the Commission the express authority to require
very exacting future standards in advance of currently available technology. The
Court ruled that the FCC could not so require, for "the Commission may not prescribe
noise regulations that go beyond the present state of the art." Electronic Industries
Association Consumer Electronics Group v. FCC, 636 F.2d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
13. Id.; see also KRASNOW, LONGLEY & TERRY, supra note 1, at 16-27. The key con-
cept utilized in the Communications Act of 1934 of regulation "in the public interest,
convenience and necessity" inherently conflicts with language in the same act, Section
326, requiring that "no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio com-
munications." Early court cases determined that the FCC did not have to ignore con-
tent, that it could consider it without necessarily engaging in censorship. See KFKB
Broadcasting Association v. Federal Radio Commission, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931);
and Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Commission, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C.
Cir. 1932). In the process of "considering" content, the Commission continuously finds
itself challenged on the grounds that its actions encompass censorship. See Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) and Fed-
eral Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
14. W. MURPHY & C. PRrrCHE7r, supra note 4, at 216-225, and L BAUM, supra note 4,
at 86-93.
15. Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
16. Id.
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peals for the District of Columbia overturned the FCC's actions
by a 2-1 vote." Of the two judges voting to overturn, only Chief
Judge David Bazelon concluded that the FCC's actions vio-
lated the First Amendment. 8 When the Supreme Court subse-
quently overturned the decision, five members of the Court
agreed that the FCC's original order did not violate the First
Amendment although they were unable to agree upon a single
opinion to express those views.19
Statutory review, on the other hand, involves determining
whether the FCC action is in accord with governing statutes,
20
such as comparing a newly adopted FCC rule or regulation
with the statutory standards of the Communications Act.21 In
this area, the vague "public interest, convenience and neces-
sity" standard embodied in the Communications Act has of-
fered the courts the opportunity for a significant role in
overseeing the FCC.22 As the Supreme Court once observed:
Congress has charged the courts with the responsibility of say-
ing whether the Commission has fairly exercised its discretion
within the vaguish, penumbral bounds expressed by the stan-
dard of '"public interest." It is our responsibility to say whether
the Commission has been guided by proper considerations in
bringing the deposit of its experience, the disciplined feel of
the expert, to bear ... in the public interest.2
In addition to the direct impact of judicial review on regula-
tory action, the courts may modify the regulatory process by
changing the rules and participants in the process itself. It was
through actions of the courts, for example, that citizen groups
secured the right to intervene in FCC radio and television li-
17. Paciflca Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
18. Id. at 24-30.
19. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 483 U.S. 726 (1978). The Justices voting to uphold
the Commission's view were Chief Justice Burger, Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, Black-
mun and Powell. This majority included former D.C. Circuit Court Judge Warren Bur-
ger, who in this case, as in many others, was voting to overturn a decision of his old
court. This is less surprising when one notes that Chief Justice Burger, when on the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was usually a minority member
of that court at bitter odds with Chief Judge David Bazelon.
20. The governing statutes themselves may be written with purposeful ambiguity
reflecting Congressional uncertainty or lack of agreement. See KRASNOw, LONGLEY &
TERY, supra note 1, at 91-96.
21. See note 13, supra.
22. See the discussion of "the 'public interest'-broadcasting battleground," in
KRASNOw, LONGLEY & TERRY, supra note 1, at 16-19.
23. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 91 (1953).
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censing proceedings. In a landmark decision24 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in
March 1966, permitted the Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ to challenge the license renewal of
WLBT-TV in Jackson, Mississippi.25 The Church alleged that
WLBT discriminated against its black viewers who constituted
45 percent of the population of Jackson.26 The Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that responsible community organizations such
as "civic associations, professional societies, unions, churches,
and educational institutions or associations" should be allowed
to contest license renewal applications.2? In this unanimous
opinion, Judge Warren Burger ruled that granting legal stand-
ing to the listening audience who have an obvious and acute
concern with licensing proceedings is essential to ensure "that
the holders of broadcasting licenses be responsive to the needs
of the audience without which the broadcaster could not
exist. 28
Following this 1966 decision, the FCC held the required hear-
ings, although with only limited citizen group participation, '
and granted the contested license renewal to the incumbent
broadcaster-the owners of WLBT.3 0 In 1969, however, the
Court of Appeals spoke again in these proceedings, overruling
the FCC's decision to renew WLBT's license. 1 It ordered the
FCC to consider new applications for the WLBT license. 2 As a
result of these 1966 and 1969 decisions, the right of the public
and of citizen groups to participate in a station's license re.-
newal hearing was established.33
Another way the courts influence FCC decisions is through
24. Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
25. Id. at 1009.
26. Id. at 998.
27. Id. at 1005.
28. Id. at 1002.
29. Office of the Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d
543, 544 (1969).
30. Id. A probationary one-year license was granted.
31. Id. at 550.
32. Id. The Court was concerned with the Commission's seeming eagerness to rid
itself of this case and its associated citizen group participation requirement.
33. The Pool of Experts on Access, BROADCASTING, September 20, 1971, at 36. Con-
cerning the changing roles of citizen groups in broadcast regulatory policy-making, see
KRASNOW, LONGLEY & TERRY, supra note 1, at 33-86, and L. LONGLEY, E. KRASNOW & H.
TERRY, Citizen Groups in Broadcast Regulatory Policy-Making, in GOVERNMENT REGU-
LATION, (M. DUBNMCK & A. GrrELSON, eds., forthcoming, 1983).
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the handling of appeals. Under Section 402(b) of the Commu-
nications Act,34 appeals from FCC decisions in broadcast i-
censing matters may be ified only with the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.35  Section
402(a) of the Communications Act requires that appeals in-
volving compliance with FCC rules and orders are to be filed
with the federal district courts, 36 whereas appeals of FCC rule
changes are to be fied directly in any of the twelve circuit
courts of appeals 7.3  Decisions of the courts of appeals are final,
subject only to review by the United States Supreme Court
upon issuance of a writ of certiorari.38 As a result, most FCC
cases are now finally decided by the courts of appeals, particu-
larly the District of Columbia Circuit.39 It is perhaps paradoxi-
cal that this court, certainly the most experienced in broadcast
cases, has in recent years overturned many FCC decisions,
while the United States Supreme Court, much less exper-
ienced in broadcast issues, has the final word and has gener-
ally supported the Commission.4°
The Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme
Court often disagree on public policy questions. For example,
in 1971, the Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace per-
suaded the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to
rule that the public has a First Amendment right to hear di-
verse viewpoints, and that accordingly, a broadcaster who ac-
cepts paid commercial advertisements cannot exclude those
who want to buy time to present opinions on controversial is-
34. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C., § 402(b).
35. Id.
36. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b).
37. Id.
38. Congress established the writ of certiorari in 1925 to enable the Supreme Court
to cut down the volume of its work by allowing it to decline to review some cases. See
A. W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 136-45 (1964); L BAUM, supra note 4,
at 96, and CONG. Q., The Supreme Court and-Its Work 60 (1981).
39. On September 17, 1981, the FCC proposed to Congress that this section of the
act be amended to allow most appeals of Commission decisions to be taken to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the judicial circuit in which the petitioner resides or has its princi-
pal office. As the Commission candidly noted, "[t] his amendment probably would re-
duce the importance of the D.C. Circuit's role in the interpretation of communications
law." FCC LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL, TRACK I 57 (September 17, 1981) (mimeo).
40. An excellent example of Circuit Court-Supreme Court disagreement over FCC
policy is provided in the complex events surrounding the Commission's attempts to
set policy concerning radio format changes. See KRASNOw, LONGLEY & TERRY, Supra
note 1, at 145-175, and H. TERRY, E. KRASNOW & L. LDNGLEY, Radio Format Change,
forthcoming. See also the discussion in note 19, supra.
No. 3]
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sues.4 ' This circuit court decision was overruled in a landmark
1973 case where the United States Supreme Court ruled that
broadcasters' compliance with the FCC's Fairness Doctrine
sufficed to serve the public. Rather than being forced to accept
paid opinion advertising, broadcasters could choose how to
present opposing views.Y The Supreme Court has also over-
ruled the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and af-
firmed the FCC's decisions not to break up most co-owned
newspaper/broadcast stations in the same community 43 and
not to regulate radio format changes."
The most controversial question that arises here is whether
the courts actually make communications policy. One school
of thought on this issue is reflected by the late Judge Harold
Leventhal, of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
who noted that courts are normally more concerned with how a
decision was reached than with the substance of the decision
itself:
Its supervisory function calls on the court to intervene not
merely in case of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the
mandate in the legislative charter, but more broadly if the
court becomes aware, especially from a combination of danger
signals, that the agency has not taken a "hard look" at the sali-
ent problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned deci-
sion-making. If the agency has not shirked this fundamental
task, however, the court exercises restraint and affirms the
agency's action even though the court would on its own ac-
count have made different findings or adopted different
standards.4'
Things may not be as clear, however, as Leventhal suggests,
for it is possible that the courts cannot, in the communications
area, avoid making policy. The "public interest, convenience
and necessity" standard is so imprecise that almost any inter-
pretation of it-by the FCC or by a court-involves making pol-
41. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
42. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
43. FCC v. NCCB, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
44. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 101 S. Ct. 1266 (1981). For an ex-
amination of the complex events surrounding Commission policy toward format
changes, see KRASNOW, LONGLSY & TERRY, .upra note 1, at 145-175, and H. TERRY, 1..
KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, Radio Format Change, forthcoming.
45. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
[Vol. 4
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icy. As former FCC Commissioner Glen Robinson, a
proponent of a second school of thought, notes:
The delegation of legislative power [through the Communica-
tions Act] ultimately transfers power not only to agencies but
also to courts that supervise the exercise of agency power.
This may seem contradictory. In theory, as statutory terms of
agency power and discretion broaden, the justification for judi-
cial interference, at least on substantive or jurisdictional
grounds, becomes more limited. However, when such terms
(or their judicial construction) become so broad as to lose all
practical significance, an agency and its supervisory courts en-
joy ample room to share the power that the legislature has
relinquished.46
In Robinson's view, it is unavoidable that courts will make and
shape policy even though it is not necessarily desirable that
they do so.
A third school of thought on this issue, reflected in the views
of former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia David Bazelon, is that it is proper for courts to
adopt activist positions toward making regulatory policy. Ac-
cording to Bazelon, "[W] e stand on the threshold of a new era
in the history of the long and fruitful collaboration of adminis-
trative agencies and reviewing courts. 47 It is no longer enough
for the courts to uphold agency actions "with a nod in the di-
rection of the 'substantial evidence' test, and a bow to the mys-
teries of administrative expertise."'48 Bazelon believes a more
positive or activist judicial role is demanded by the changing
character of administrative litigation.49 According to Bazelon,
"[ciourts are increasingly asked to review administrative ac-
tion that touches on fundamental personal interests in life,
health and liberty .... To protect these interests from admin-
istrative arbitrariness, it is necessary, but not sufficient, to in-
sist on strict judicial scrutiny of administrative action.5 0
A textbook example of this activist judicial review of broad-
cast regulatory policy-making espoused by Bazelon is evident
in a 1977 decision which set aside the Commission's pay cable
46. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commiassion" An Essay on Regulatory
Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169, 176 (1978). For a perceptive if somewhat dated article
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit see Millard, Broad-
casting's Pre-emptive Court, BROADCASTING, Aug. 30, 1971, at 17.
47. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
48. Id.




programming restrictions.51 The court conducted its own ex-
tensive review of the evidence in the record, both analyzing
and criticizing the methodology of mathematical models con-
tained in broadcaster comments as well as the meaning of the
results themselves. The court also displayed its activist role by
extending prohibitions against ex parte, or off-the-record, con-
tacts between FCC decision-making personnel and parties in-
terested in the outcome of informal rule-making proceedings.5 2
The Supreme Court, however, has shown little interest in the
"partnership" between the courts and the Commission in
* shaping policy. In recent years, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly overturned decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia where, in the Supreme Court's eyes, the
Court of Appeals has substituted its policy or judgment for
that of the "expert" administrative agency-the FCC.5 3 In a ra-
dio station format change controversy,5 for example, early Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit decisions ordered the FCC to
supervise broadcasters' choices of formats under certain condi-
tions. In spite of these decisions, the FCC decided not to su-
pervise the choice of formats. The Court of Appeals
overturned this FCC decision. Judge Leventhal's concurring
opinion accused the FCC of violating the "court-agency part-
nership [which] depends on mutuality of respect and under-
standing."5 The majority of the en banc court rejected
arguments of the FCC that the judiciary had substituted its
policy on the matter for the FCC's policy rather than just sub-
jecting the FCC's procedures and standards to a straight for-
ward comparison with the Communications Act.56
The United States Supreme Court, however, .overturned the
Court of Appeals. The Court specifically disagreed with the ap-
pellate court's entire approach to the review of FCC decisions:
Our opinions have repeatedly emphasized that the Commis-
51. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977).
52. Id. at 57. The exparte prohibition is "designed to better assure fairness and to
avoid suspicions of impropriety.... ." Id. (quoting White House Fact Sheet on Exec.
Order No. 11,920 (June 10, 1976)).
53. A particularly forceful statement emphasizing this tendency was provided by
Supreme Court Justice Byron White in speaking for a seven justice majority in FCC v.
WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 101 S. Ct. 1266 (1981). See text accompanying note
57, infra.
54. See note 44, supra.
55. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
56. Id. at 854-858.
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sion's judgment regarding how the public interest is best
served is entitled to substantial judicial deference.... The
Commission's implementation of the public interest standard,
when based on a rational weighing of competing policies, is not
to be set aside by the Court of Appeals, for "the weighing of
policies under the 'public interest' standard is a task that Con-
gress has delegated to the Commission in the first instance."57
Because the courts play an important role in the FCC policy-
making process, other participants in this process attempt to
influence court action. Obviously, various interest groups can-
not approach the courts through the same methods that would
be appropriate in approaching Congress; there are no cam-
paign funds, no ballot boxes, and no lavish lunches with which
to influence federal judges.58 In general, there are only two
methods by which pressure may be exerted on the courts. The
first method is the appointment of judges. Here, influence pro-
ceeds indirectly through the President and the Senate. The
other, and more direct means of influencing the courts, is
through the regular procedure of litigation. Filing a court ap-
peal is largely a defensive maneuver because the policy has al-
ready been made by the FCC by the time a group is forced to
resort to judicial review. But while the FCC and the Congress
are most often affected by politically powerful and wealthy
groups, the courts may be influenced almost as easily by a sin-
gle individual or very small groups as by a large and powerful
interest. Even in cases where the outside groups are not par-
ties to the case, the courts may permit them to participate in
the role of amici curiae.59 Decisions of the court are also fre-
57. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596, 101 S. Ct. 1266 (1981) (quoting
FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 810 (1978)). Per-
haps an explanation for such judicial restraint can be found in the views of Chief Jus-
tice William Howard Taft, who served on the Supreme Court during broadcasting's
early years. When asked to explain his reluctance to review cases involving radio law,
Taft is reported to have said "[i]nterpreting the law on this subject is something like
trying to interpret the law of the occult. It seems like dealing with something super-
natural. I want to put it off as long as possible in the hope that it becomes more under-
standable before the court passes on the questions involved." Cited in Coase, The
Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAw & ECON. 40 (1959).
58. The following discussion is based on L. BETH, POLrics, THE CONSTTUTION AND
THE SUPREME COURT 57-76 (1962). For a recent analysis of the courts in regulatory re-
form, see Bullock m & Regens, The Courts as a Source of Regulatory Revitalization:
External Agenda Setting and Equal Education Programs, 1 POL'Y STUD. REV. 565-571
(1982).
59. Amicus curiae is defined as "[a) friend of the court, a person not a party to
litigation who volunteers or is invited by the court to give his views on a case." CONG.
Q., supra note 38, at 246. See also L. BAUM, supra note 4, at 74-76, and Barber, Third
No. 31
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quently influenced by factors such as the strategic timing of a
bonafide test case, the submission of a well-written brief, the
rendition of persuasive oral argument, or the publication of a
thoughtful law review article or book on the specific issue. In
short, the courts may be influenced by quite legitimate means.
And, in turn, the courts, through their growing pervasive role
in the regulatory process, profoundly influence every aspect of
broadcast regulatory policy-making.
Parties in Litigation: A Systematic View of the Judicial Function, 29 JouRNAL OF POL-
Tics 41 (1967).
[Vol. 
